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Executive Summary
In July 2012, Kurds in northern Syria began taking control of  territory. This led to the 
creation of  the largely self-governing areas known collectively as Rojava (Western Kurd-
istan), and a new experiment in local government which has deep significance for Syrian, 
Kurdish, Middle Eastern and international geopolitics. Four years on from this unprece-
dented development, the LSE Middle East Centre convened a workshop on 19 July 2016 
to examine the progress and nature of  the Rojava project. Nine specialists on Kurdish, 
Syrian and Turkish politics presented short papers and contributed to rich discussions over 
the day. Colleagues from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Depart-
ment for International Development also made valuable contributions. The healthy level 
of  debate was testament to the complexity and nuance of  the issues and this report seeks 
to introduce the key themes which emerged and provide new insights into Rojava. 
The workshop was split into four sessions. The first sought to understand Rojava through 
analysis of  the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party, PYD) and its party 
complex, the new political and social architecture, and the structure and operations of  its 
armed force, the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Defence Units, YPG). The second session 
examined the parties of  the other Kurdish faction, the Kurdistan National Council (KNC), 
Rojava’s relationship to the Syrian regime and its engagement with other Syrian actors.
The third session moved north to consider the ambitions held for Rojava by the Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK), which is the mother party of  the 
PYD, and also Turkish scenarios for dealing with its Rojava problem. The final session 
explored Rojava’s activities and relationships in the wider international arena. This report 
provides a distillation of  the presentations and discussions. 
Understanding Rojava
The PYD has unilaterally created Rojava and established itself  as the dominant force in 
Kurdish areas. Understanding the party is therefore central to understanding its political 
construct. The PYD’s origins lie in the decision made by the PKK to broaden its support 
for the Kurdish struggle beyond Turkey to the whole region. Building on earlier support 
for the PKK among some Kurds in Syria, the PYD was founded in 2003 as the Syrian 
branch of  the movement and has since been transformed from a fringe offshoot of  the 
PKK to the leading Kurdish party in Syria. The PYD was not founded or developed 
with any expectation of  gaining power. Rather, it has shown remarkable opportunism and 
organisation to exploit the war in Syria and to implement its programme. It is notable that 
the first attempt to put Abdullah Öcalan’s ideas of  democratic confederalism into practice 
is occurring in Syria, a country not previously to the fore of  Kurdish political development.
The PYD’s relationship to its mother party is a defining and pervasive feature of  Rojava. 
Its claim that the PKK’s influence is fraternal and ideological, but without operational 
aspects, is unlikely to be accurate. Instead, this relationship remains unclear and is 
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contested through three broad theories: shadowy PKK figures tell the PYD what to do; 
the PYD makes the decisions, but with PKK help; and some PYD members are tired of 
PKK interference and are struggling against this. 
The PYD’s structure as a political party is very clearly laid out and the party is proud of 
its highly consultative nature. For example, rules state that decisions must be agreed by 
two thirds of  party members. Whether this system functions as such is another matter, not 
least because of  the problematic question of  the relationship with the PKK. The PYD 
claims that it is but one political party within a broader socio-political movement known 
as TEV-DEM (Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk, Movement for a Democratic Society), but in 
practice the distinction between the two is vague. 
Another problematic aspect of  the PYD project is the party’s inclination towards author-
itarianism. The PYD denies this – or pleads for understanding in conditions of  war – but 
its inability, or refusal, to work with the many other Kurdish parties in Syria has con-
tributed to polarisation and tension. As Rojava continues to strengthen, it is possible this 
will increase. Alternatively, as the PYD takeover becomes complete, its opponents may 
become reconciled to the project as the only viable option for Kurds, though this may also 
encourage further PYD domination.
Despite the emphasis on the political and social achievements of  the popular movement, 
the PYD and Rojava would not have been successful without the victories of  the YPG. 
While many Syrian Kurds had fought with the PKK or with the Kurds in Iraq, there was 
no history of  armed Kurdish insurgency in Syria until the civil war. Some groundwork 
was laid from 2007, when the ceasefire in Turkey allowed the PKK more time to focus 
on the movement in Syria. Since the ‘Rojava revolution’ began in July 2012, the YPG 
has steadily conducted the ‘liberation’ of  Kurdish areas when it took control of  Kobane, 
followed by Afrin and some towns in the Jazira. 
The YPG’s successful defence of  Kobane against Islamic State (IS) in 2014–2015 has 
proved highly significant as it forced the US to start providing military support to the 
Kurds, demonstrated the ability of  the YPG, and provided a powerful rallying point for 
the Kurdish movement. Subsequent military gains have enabled the spread of  Rojava 
across two contiguous cantons, with the YPG now emboldened to try to link the third in 
the west and create an enlarged and unbroken Rojava across the length of  northern Syria. 
The current military operation to take the town of  Manbij from IS is crucial to this plan 
and is about to succeed. 
However, this push further westwards is frowned upon by the US, whose support or dis-
approval is important to the YPG. The decision in 2015 to create the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF), a larger coalition of  militias which includes non-Kurds but is dominated 
by the YPG, was a clear attempt to win international backing and to calm the fears of 
Arabs and other groups in northern Syria of  a Kurdish takeover. The move, however, was 
not purely cynical packaging, as there are non-Kurdish forces fighting within the SDF, 
including an Arab militia taking part in the Manbij operation. The Arab brigades include 
tribes with old relationships to the PYD, those expelled from Raqqa by IS who are seeking 
revenge, and groups created by the US who have been forced to join.
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The YPG may be a stronger actor than the PYD; it certainly appears to have more popu-
lar support as the defender of  Kurdish communities. Not all members of  the YPG follow 
PYD ideology. Another notable aspect of  the YPG is the presence of  Kurdish fighters 
from Turkey and Iran. This may be causing some tensions in Rojava. There is also a 
new phenomenon of  Kurds from Turkey who are not members of  the PKK crossing the 
border to fight for the YPG. The extent to which PKK fighters control the YPG is not 
agreed but it is clear that Syrian Kurdish veterans of  the PKK have fought for the YPG 
and it is possible, based on YPG casualty data, that 50 percent of  its fighters could be 
Turkish based. With around 50,000 fighters, the YPG is now much larger than the PKK’s 
8,000-member armed wing. 
The Kurdistan National Council Parties
The parties of  the KNC, the older Kurdish political movement in Syria, have fallen into 
the shadow of  the PYD. By 2011, the KNC parties were already losing popular support 
due to societal changes and the compelling narrative of  the PYD has created a blinkered 
view of  Kurdish politics in Syria. The PYD insists that other parties recognise its system, 
effectively making the opposing KNC parties illegal, exactly as they had been under the 
Baʿath regime. The PYD’s restrictions and harassment expose the shortfalls in democracy 
in the Rojava system. The pressure to sign up to the PYD project has split the KNC and 
some of  its parties have switched sides and committed to Rojava.
Despite their weakness, the KNC parties remain relevant. Within Kurdish society, the 
KNC has taken on the important role of  opposition to the PYD’s rule, in which issues 
including forced conscription, conscription of  minors and arbitrary arrest have emerged. 
In the wider Syrian and international field, it is positioned in support of  the Syrian upris-
ing and has an important role to play in the Syrian National Council (SNC) in ensuring 
Kurds are represented and the question of  the status of  Kurdish areas is properly consid-
ered. However, their relationship with the SNC is still uncomfortable as the latter is often 
hostile to Kurdish interests and opposes Kurdish autonomy. This could force the KNC to 
leave the SNC and seek agreement with the PYD. Kurds of  both factions feel there should 
be a Kurdish delegation in the peace talks, in addition to the SNC, as they form a national 
group rather than a political party.
The KNC is stuck between the PYD and the SNC, with no likelihood of  improving either 
relationship. It is focussing its efforts on internationalising its role and gaining legitimacy. 
The KNC has also added federalism as a demand alongside constitutional recognition of 
Kurdish identity. However, its version of  federalism differs from that of  the PYD in that 
it is ethnic rather than democratic confederal and would not be unilaterally imposed. 
Instead, the KNC aims for a binding international agreement that guarantees federalism 
alongside Kurdish rights. The KNC is backed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
in Iraq that hosts the KNC’s militia, the ‘Rojava Peshmerga’, which the PYD views as a 
rival and will not allow to enter Syria. 
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Relations between Rojava and Damascus 
The relationship between the PKK and the Syrian regime dates back to the 1980s when 
Hafez al-Assad provided sanctuary to the movement. In 2003, Syrian intelligence watched 
as Syrian PKK supporters they were familiar with reconstituted themselves as the PYD. 
After the Kurdish unrest and deaths in 2004, the two sides agreed new dynamics of  com-
munication to avoid future violence. In 2011, under pressure from the popular uprising, 
Bashar al-Assad made some overtures to Kurds, including granting citizenship to the large 
group of  stateless people. In July 2012, the YPG took control of  some Kurdish towns the 
day after the regime was rocked by a serious bomb attack in Damascus. At the time, the 
PYD opposed foreign intervention but wanted regime change. 
The regime’s mentality is focussed on security as much as politics and this has influenced 
its approach to Rojava. It kept security forces in Qamishli as arrangements developed 
ad hoc, government salaries continued to be paid by Damascus, and services were still 
provided by the Syrian state. The regime–PYD relationship is a marriage of  convenience 
which has a very rocky existence, as seen in fatal clashes in Qamishli in April 2016. After 
the trouble, the regime sent senior people to talk to the PYD who agreed to let the regime 
operate unmolested in defined areas. 
As both the regime and the PYD became increasingly threatened by Jabhat al-Nusra and 
IS, their mutual cooperation increased and this continues in patches. For example, there 
is close coordination in Sheikh Maqsood in Aleppo against Jabhat al-Nusra and other 
groups, while there is a smaller regime presence in Kobane and Afrin. The most import-
ant factor on the ground is who is killing whom on a certain day.
There are two main views in Damascus of  the Kurdish project. The first is that Syria will 
return to being a centralised state and Rojava will disappear. Bashar Jaafari, a hardliner, 
has stated that Saleh Muslim (the Co-Chair of  the PYD) can leave Syria when Rojava is 
abolished. Another regime view is looking at decentralisation more broadly as a possible 
model for holding the state together. As the ruling group is from the Alawi minority, the 
value is apparent. In both views, Damascus largely ignores the political developments and 
grand claims made in Rojava. The international exclusion of  the PYD has only benefitted 
the regime. However, there is a greater risk of  a clash between the regime and Rojava if 
the hardliners in Damascus win. The fate of  the town of  Manbij is again very significant.
Rojava and the Opposition in Syria
Relations between the PYD and the opposition in Syria are poor and complicated. The 
fall of  the regime is a much lower priority for the PYD than for the rebels. The only reason 
the rebels and the PYD are not fighting much is because the rebels lack the capacity to 
open another front, but more bloody fights are probable. Despite this, a war economy and 
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trade between all sides exist and will continue. The PYD and IS are the best-structured 
and organised of  the actors in northern Syria, competing for resources as well as territory 
and power.
Arab tribes in the north are divided and are neither totally pro- or anti-PYD. Rebels in 
Hasakah see the spread of  Rojava as a PYD invasion. There is a historical legacy of  ten-
sions between Kurds and Arabs, with micro-conflicts on the ground having deep historical 
and tribal elements, such as the settling of  scores from a 1934 land dispute in Ras al-Ayn. 
Events in Tel Abyad in 2015 are instructive for the PYD’s approach to areas with high 
Arab populations. The PYD imposed its own governance structure after Kurdish forces 
captured the town from IS. An attempt was made to negotiate for a 65 percent Arab quota 
as representative of  the population, but the PYD refused and Tel Abyad was joined to the 
Kobane canton. Many Arabs feel treated as second class citizens in PYD areas, considered 
guilty of  supporting IS until proven otherwise. What happens after Manbij falls is there-
fore very important; will the PYD allow the local rebels to govern themselves? 
The Importance of Rojava for the PKK
It is essential to consider the PKK’s ideology and political plan in order to understand 
developments in Rojava. The party proposes a system of  democracy which exists in 
parallel to state structures. This is non-territorial based, although it involves territorial 
control. It is non-ethnic and is organised through the communities. The PKK argues for 
‘demoi-cracy’, democracy of  many different people, rather than one, through democratic 
autonomy. To them, it is not a question of  states, but of  popular democracies. Since 2010, 
the PKK has moved away from demanding an independent state for Kurds, proclaiming 
that many groups can co-exist within the same entity and democratic autonomy.
The developments in the Kurdish conflict in Syria are seen by the PKK as part of  a grad-
ual move towards transforming the Kurdish conflicts in Turkey and finding a peaceful 
resolution. The implementation of  democratic autonomy and self-rule in Rojava provides 
a base to influence political developments in Turkey and, in the long-term, to build a 
regional consensus on securing Kurdish rights.
The PKK believes that the Kurdish entity in Syria will contribute positively to the reso-
lution of  problems in Turkey, as Turkey cannot continue to repress Kurdish culture and 
rights. It also believes these solutions should be applied to the Kurdish questions through-
out the whole region, including Iran. The PKK wants Kurdish national unity within a 
hybrid structure, rather than nation states.
A great weakness of  the Kurdish movement in Turkey has been its lack of  international 
support. If  the international community engages with Rojava, which then gains legiti-
macy, it will anchor the PKK more firmly in the pro-democracy and moderate camp. 
This would give the PKK complex the chance to network with bigger powers and better 
influence regional players.
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The idea of  democratic autonomy was previously sneered at. Now, there is an example which 
can work in practice, hence the PKK’s argument across Kurdish communities and political 
debates is strengthened. Miracles cannot be expected in Rojava where there is a desperate 
fight against IS’ genocidal campaign. But there are clear signs of  resilience and positivity, 
including the increase in non-Kurdish representation and promotion of  gender equality.
Turkey’s Rojava Problem
For Turkey, Rojava is a multi-layered and multi-dimensional issue. Turkey’s policies 
towards the Kurds in Syria are utterly inseparable from Turkish domestic Kurdish poli-
cies, as are the two Kurdish populations. The Turkish state has a strong historical tradition 
of  seeing any Kurdish polity as a threat to its own Kurdish issue. The PKK and its allies 
pose a threat to the security and territorial unity of  the republic and this is the key factor 
ahead of  all. This doctrine is institutionalised and is not questioned.
Turkey sees three terrorist groups as threats: hard leftists, Islamists and the PKK. Hence, 
it is very natural to expand this definition to include the PYD, which is part of  the PKK 
monster. The PKK is fundamentally seen as the greatest challenge and its ideology of  a 
parallel political and social structure is very scary. Turkey defines terrorism in a way that it 
can use expansively and apply broadly to extend beyond active PKK members. There are 
some similarities to its concern over the Kurdistan Region of  Iraq (KRI) in the 1990s but 
Kurdistan-Syria is different because of  the involvement of  the PKK. The KRI became a 
digestible Kurdish option because of  its enmity to the PKK.
Turkey sees the growth of  Kurdish power across its south and south-east borders as a 
threat to its integrity and is suspicious of  foreign scheming to undermine its authority. 
Turkey has so far made a huge investment in opposing Assad, which is hard to give up. 
However, the Turkish attempt to equate the PYD with the PKK and delegitimise it inter-
nationally has failed. In the aftermath of  the botched coup in July 2016 and IS attacks 
inside Turkey, the Turkish army was ordered into northern Syria. The operation was 
ostensibly against IS but clearly also aimed to curb the gains made by the Kurds.
Four scenarios may be laid out for Turkey in dealing with its Rojava problem:
• Invasion or military operation to extinguish Rojava: The current military intervention 
is a blow to Rojava, but it is not fatal. A much deeper Turkish assault is unlikely be-
cause international support would not be forthcoming, the Syrian war is too complex 
and Turkish domestic issues are too challenging. It would likely draw Turkey into long 
and difficult fight with the PKK/YPG inside Syria and would also cause an escala-
tion of  the conflict inside Turkey. It could also cause large scale displacement of  the 
Kurdish population in Syria.
• Wiping out the PKK, Rojava will then collapse: Turkey is not likely to eliminate the 
PKK. However, its fight against the group is further destabilising Turkish domestic 
politics. This is the option Turkey currently chooses.
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• Coming to terms with Rojava: This scenario is not compatible with Turkey’s secu-
rity doctrine.
• The Syrian war ends with an international peace deal: This would have to include 
the Kurds. The Turkish response will be negative, refusing to accept a Kurdish entity 
and it will scupper the PYD’s involvement. Turkey’s position will delay the chance of 
a Syrian peace deal.
Rojava in the International Arena
Despite its remarkable gains, Rojava is highly fragile and desperately short of  friends. 
All other actors in Syria are hostile, as are the KRI and Turkey. In such a deeply hostile 
neighbourhood, any support Rojava can gain internationally is vital. Hence the emerging 
autonomous region has made notable efforts to craft and spread a narrative which appeals 
to international governments and publics.
The narrative promoted by the PYD has two themes. The first is that of  the wicked ene-
mies of  Rojava. Under this, Rojava is the heroic underdog fighting for the survival of  the 
Kurdish minority against overwhelming and rather evil enemies. Rojava was established 
only for self-defence but now offers protection. It is easy to depict IS within this narrative 
and it plays well to Western ears. 
The 6-month siege and victory over IS in Kobane in 2014–2015 was momentous as it 
changed the Kurdish narrative to heroic martyrdom and, rarely in the Kurdish move-
ment, to one of  victory. It also transformed Rojava’s relations with the West, especially the 
US, and proved it could be a useful ally.
Turkey shares an equally negative status for Rojava, and is consistently condemned for 
its hostility to peaceful, democracy-loving Kurds and in particular for supporting IS. The 
Assad regime is vicious and illegitimate and the Syrian opposition is led by expatriates 
motivated by personal ambition who do not support democracy. The KRI does not help 
Kurds as it is in the pocket of  Turkey.
The second theme is Rojava’s self-narrative of  its wholesome alternative as democratic, 
popular, secular, gender-equal and well organised. The PYD is acutely aware of  the ques-
tion of  Kurdish ethnic domination of  northern Syria and boasts of  its inclusion of  ethnic 
and religious minorities, quotas and official language status for Arabic and Syriac. The 
appearance of  ‘Northern Syria’ in the name of  the autonomous region is part of  this effort 
to downplay its Kurdishness, as is the creation of  the SDF as a multi-sectarian force worthy 
of  international backing, especially given the alternatives. And in 2016 the movement’s 
international representation is being officially separated into PYD and Rojava offices.
There is also, interestingly, a strong emphasis on loyalty to Syria and claims of  Syrian 
patriotism. This is wholly compatible with the ideology of  democratic autonomy which is 
intended to be of  benefit to all peoples, not just Kurds.
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For Western states, there lies a conflict between the imperative to stop IS and acute sensi-
tivities to Turkey. There are many reasons for Western hesitation, like the importance of 
the use of  Turkish air bases. The lines of  Syria’s existing borders should not be endangered 
by an autonomous movement. The US and EU powers oppose the unilateral actions of 
the PYD and its distance from the Syrian Arab opposition. The West also criticises the 
PYD for its authoritarian behaviour and prefers to sponsor the KNC, which is a member 
of  the SNC, recognised by them as the legitimate representation of  the Syrian people 
since 2012.
However, Rojava has become attractive to international powers operating in the Syrian 
war. Most importantly for Western states and Russia, it is proving effective against IS. The 
tipping point for the West was the battle for Kobane which halted IS at a time it appeared 
unstoppable. The US and its allies continued to carry out supportive air strikes and there 
is currently a small but apparently growing US military presence in Kurdish areas coordi-
nating the support and providing advice. 
In addition, Rojava offers a model of  government much more in sympathy with Western 
ideals than any alternative operating in Syria. The PKK is on Western terrorist lists but 
the PYD is not and despite Turkish pressure, not likely to be. Russia, so far free from Turk-
ish pressure, is Rojava’s strongest international state supporter. Russia does not publically 
back Kurdish ambitions but pushes harder for PYD inclusion in Syria’s peace talks. 
Concluding Points
In May 2016, the SDF launched an offensive to capture the strategically significant town 
of  Manbij from Islamic State. By early August, they were in control of  most of  the town. 
Many of  the questions thrown up by the four years of  the Rojava experiment are reflected 
in this military operation and its political outcome. 
One of  these is the extent of  the PYD’s commitment to inclusiveness and power sharing 
with the large non-Kurdish communities of  northern Syria. Manbij is a majority Arab 
town and Arab fighters in the SDF are leading the attack. The US, which is supporting 
the operation, intends that Arabs will govern the town after its fall. However, the YPG 
and PYD may impose a council of  their own choosing as they did in Tel Abyad. The 
PYD’s refusal to accommodate the Kurdish parties of  the KNC is consistent with its 
determination to maximise any power it can take. A stronger Rojava could cause further 
authoritarianism and polarisation among Kurds.
Related to this is the key question of  the growth of  Rojava into a contiguous territory. 
The gaps between the three pockets of  Kurdish-majority areas have been a weakness of 
Western Kurdistan. Two have been joined through the success of  the YPG and there is 
an obvious desire to connect the third. This would mean absorbing more non-Kurds into 
Rojava and establish it as a solid block on the map of  Syria. The deep tensions in the 
relationship between Rojava and the Baʿathist regime are also visible in Manbij. Kurdish 
expansion into the corridor to the east of  Aleppo would not be welcomed by Damascus 
as it eyes an ever more entrenched rival administration.
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A contiguous federal region of  Rojava would run along the vast majority of  Turkey’s 
border with Syria. Turkey would furiously oppose this expansion on its southern flank but 
its options to intervene appear limited, other than by increasing pressure on its allies. The 
awkwardness of  the position for the US and its partners would be even more exposed as 
they attempt to defeat IS while keeping the PYD in check. Greater foreign dialogue with 
the PYD could prove useful in reinforcing messages of  the actions it should take, and there 
are signs that the PYD is receptive to this.
Whatever the developments after the Manbij offensive, the question of  the constitutional 
relationship between Kurdish communities and the Syrian state is pressing. There cannot 
be a peaceful settlement in Syria without the inclusion of  its Kurdish population. Despite 
the difficulties presented by Syrian opposition to federalism and the complications of  Syr-
ia’s make-up, mechanisms need to be examined for a constitutional agreement with the 
autonomous area within the eventual settlement.
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Abbreviations
IS Islamic State
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
KNC Kurdistan National Council
KRI Kurdistan Region of  Iraq
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
PYD Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party)
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
SNC Syrian National Council
TEV-DEM Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk (Movement for a Democratic Society)
YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Defence Units)
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